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ABSTRACT 
We analyze deficiencies in existing Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) 
systems and protocols, and propose a new system of PUFs (SoP) that is numerically 
secure under extended attacker privileges and attack scenarios. Our proposed 
system uses a multi-level authentication scheme and employs different designs of 
PUF to achieve high security with low computational complexity and small 
footprint.  
By employing role-specific PUF designs, SoP reduces the area over existing 
PUF-based authentication solutions by more than 68%. The key principles are: (i) 
reduce assumptions required to guarantee numerical security to a minimum set of 
practical assumptions; (ii) combine different PUF types to optimize security while 
minimizing resource requirements; (iii) provide multiple layers of authentication as 
a force-multiplier for the trusted party.  
This multi-level protocol resolves security deficiencies with regard to man-
in-the-middle attacks and challenge-response-pair (CRP) storage issues in 
conventional PUF protocols. Furthermore, SoP allows recognition and sealing of 
security breaches. A mathematical formulation of the attack complexity and 
statistical evaluation based on simulated PUF data show the strength of this new 
protocol. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the age of ubiquitous computing, our society relies on computing devices 
at every level, and with this comes the increasing need for computer security. While 
we are aware of the damages that could be caused by misuse of credit-cards or 
RFID-tags, the emergence of ubiquitous computing has brought new issues and 
further increases the importance of secure authentication. With wearable 
technology and personal medical devices, an adversary that circumvents 
authentication protocols can directly impact the physical well-being of users. 
Moreover, such authentication failures in wireless sensor networks for border 
control and defense purposes can have even worse consequences. A unifying 
characteristic of the new device generation is their need for security with minimal 
resources and power consumption, and thus typically only allowing minimum 
resource allocation for security components. 
Software and network security have gained increased attention and are 
widely perceived to provide the necessary means for secure communication, 
authentication and data storage. However, without the appropriate hardware 
mechanisms, no system can be secure. For example, side-channel information 
leakage was used to successfully attack AES implementations [1], and secret keys 
can be extracted from volatile memory long after the device is off [2].  
Conservative security and authentication protocols are based on secure 
storage and usage of secret keys [3]. In the past, this meant that non-volatile 
memory (NVM) and fuses were used to provide a secret key [4]. However, NVM 
is prone to invasive physical and non-invasive imaging attacks [5]. Additionally, 
classic cryptographic algorithms are too complex and power intensive for many 
applications [5].  
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As a lightweight, silicon intrinsic solution to hardware security, Physically 
Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [2] were proposed. PUFs use device intrinsic 
variations in otherwise equally designed circuit elements as secret. Thus, PUFs do 
not exhibit the same weaknesses towards non-invasive imaging and invasive 
attacks. However, PUFs only provide the basic building block for security and have 
to be embedded into a system that can participate in an authentication protocol. 
Many existing protocols require expensive components that are unsuitable for low-
resource applications, and furthermore do not take full advantage of the flexibility 
of the variety of PUF designs that past research has yielded. 
In the era of ubiquitous computing, authentication systems have to be 
resource- and power-efficient while providing enough flexibility to target a variety 
of applications. In the following, we describe key specifications of our PUF based 
low-cost authentication system: 
 Very light usage of active security components without costly hash functions 
on the chip or error correcting schemes. 
 Low false-negative rate to reduce the time and energy spent in authentication 
iterations. 
To address the demand for lightweight security components, the unique 
contributions of this paper include: 
 A SoP that employs different PUF types with multiple challenge and response 
levels to maximally exploit the advantages of distinct PUF designs while 
minimizing resource allocation. 
 Identification of weaknesses in existing PUF based authentication schemes and 
a novel authentication protocol based on the SoP that increases reliability and 
security. 
 Usage of secret hashing at the trusted party to exponentially increase the set of 
challenge-response pairs that a malicious party faces without implementing 
these expensive functions on the PUF circuit.  
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 A system and protocol for authentication that reduces the area as measured in 
gate-equivalent units by more than 68%.  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we review 
the background of PUF and PUF-based authentication. The main part of this thesis 
begins with Chapter 3, where issues in current PUF protocols are identified. In 
Chapter 4, we propose a new protocol and give a detailed security analysis in 
Chapter 5. An experimental evaluation that shows feasibility of the protocol is 
provided in Chapter 6. This thesis concludes with a summary in Chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK 
PUFs are characterized by their challenge (input) and response (output) 
behavior. Typically, a PUF consists of a number of equally designed components 
that have slightly different physical properties due to manufacturing variations. The 
challenge to a PUF is used to select which PUF components are compared for their 
physical properties and the response is a bit or bit-string representing the outcome 
of pairwise comparison of the selected elements.  In the following, we will first 
establish quality metrics for PUF, which will then be used to provide an overview 
of existing PUF designs. Due to their high volatility, the reliability of PUF designs 
can be a restriction for several applications, motivating additional circuitry for error 
correction. This chapter concludes with an overview of prior work on PUF based 
authentication. 
2.1 Quality Metrics 
The two main metrics of quality for PUF designs are uniqueness and 
reliability. We use inter-chip and intra-chip distances [6] for uniqueness and 
reliability to establish design criteria and implementation guidelines for SoP. Inter-
chip Hamming distance 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 is a metric for the difference between 
manufactured PUF instances and thus shows the usability of static variations 
because of the manufacturing process. Ideally, the average difference between all 
physical instances would be close to 50%, as a ratio higher or lower than that 
represents a bias in the response. It is computed as the average Hamming distance 
between different PUF instantiations for the same set of challenges, as shown in 
Equation (1). Here, 𝑚 represents the number of PUF instances and 𝐶 is the common 
challenge used during uniqueness evaluation. 
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𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 =
2
𝑚(𝑚 − 1)
∑ ∑ 𝐻𝐷(𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑘)
𝑚
𝑘=𝑖+1
𝑚−1
𝑖=1
, 
 with 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑃𝑈𝐹𝑖(𝐶), 𝑅𝑘 = 𝑃𝑈𝐹𝑘(𝐶) 
(1) 
Intra-chip Hamming distance 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 represents the variability of the 
responses to the same challenge on the same PUF instance under environment 
variations. It is a metric for the reliability of the PUF and lower values indicate 
higher reliability under dynamic variations, e.g. temperature fluctuations. Equation 
(2) shows the intra-chip Hamming distance for 𝑁 challenges, which are issued 𝐾 
times. The nominal response of the PUF is 𝑅(𝐶𝑖), while the response under 
environment variations is 𝑅′(𝐶𝑖). 
𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 =
1
𝑁∙𝐾
∑ ∑ 𝐻𝐷(𝑅(𝐶𝑖), 𝑅
′(𝐶𝑖))
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1  
𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 =
1
𝑁 ∙ 𝐾
∑ ∑ 𝐻𝐷(𝑅(𝐶𝑖), 𝑅
′(𝐶𝑖))
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(2) 
When averaged over the bit-length, we refer to the fractional Hamming 
distances 𝐹𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 and 𝐹𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟. 
2.2 PUF Designs 
In this section, we will introduce the concepts of several different PUF 
designs that are relevant to this work. The quality characteristics of these designs 
are summarized in Table 1. 
SRAM-PUF leverages device-specific process variations to generate a 
secret from the SRAM startup state. It is a low-cost PUF that is suitable for ID or 
key generation [7], [8]. 
In the Arbiter PUF [4], shown in Figure 1, an output bit is generated from a 
delay comparison of two equally designed paths. The challenge is used to select a 
specific path by controlling multiplexers that select between wire segments of equal 
parameters. Rührmair et al. presented model-building techniques that successfully 
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predicted the behavior of an Arbiter PUF with small training data [9]. A more 
secure iteration is achieved by combining 𝑁 Arbiter PUFs by XOR connection of 
the individual response bits to the N-XOR-Arbiter PUF, as shown in Figure 2. 
These XOR-Arbiter PUFs increase the difficulty of creating a model for the PUF, 
but the XOR combination  also linearly reduces the reliability of the PUF [10]. It 
was shown that a 6-XOR Arbiter PUF is very expensive to model [9]. 
 
Ring-Oscillator PUFs (RO-PUFs) [4] consist of a number of ring-oscillators 
that are designed to be equal. Based on the challenge, two multiplexers select one 
ring-oscillator each and their frequency is compared using a counter for each of the 
oscillators. This comparison determines the output bit of the RO-PUF. RO-PUF has 
been shown to achieve high reliability, but is comparably power-intensive and slow 
as many cycles are needed to distinguish the respective oscillator frequencies. 
Figure 3 shows a Ring Oscillator and how a pairwise comparison of Ring Oscillator 
frequencies builds the RO-PUF. 
Yao et al. introduced a PUF design based on the clock network of the chip 
that inherits the clock network’s stability but introduces enough variations to show 
randomness [11]. They choose specific sinks in the clock network and branch the 
clock signal from these sinks in a return path that gathers process variations to a 
network of multiplexers and an Arbiter. The Arbiter can then be used to compare 
the delay of different paths and generate a response bit.  
Table 1 Comparison of PUF Designs. 
Design 
Comparison 
PUF Designs 
𝑭𝑯𝑫𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝑭𝑯𝑫𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂 
ClockPUF [11] 0.503 0.057 
SRAM [7] 0.4997 < 0.12 
Arbiter PUF 0.51 0.05 
4-XOR Arbiter PUF [10] 0.51 0.19 
Ring-Oscillator [4] 0.4614 0.0048 
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Figure 1 The Arbiter PUF determines the response R by evaluating the delay 
difference of two equally designed but physically different paths. The challenge to 
the PUF determines the path that the signals take. 
 
 
Figure 2 The XOR-Arbiter PUF consists of N parallel Arbiter PUFs. The 
response is generated through XOR-connection of all Arbiter PUF responses. 
 
 
Figure 3 A Ring Oscillator consists of an inverter chain with an odd number of 
inverting stages (left). The challenge to the RO-PUF determines the choice of 
Ring Oscillator pair, and the output is the result of a frequency comparison. 
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2.3 Helper Circuits 
Most PUF designs only generate one output bit, as two circuit elements are 
compared. An expensive way of extracting multiple output bits is to implement as 
many PUFs as the desired number of output bits. For lightweight applications, a 
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) can also be used as a challenge 
expander, e.g. a Linear Shift Feedback Register (LFSR) [5],[12]. Based on an initial 
challenge as the seed, the PRNG will sequentially create new challenges and 
therefore multiple output bits. 
As PUF elements are designed to be equal, their response is volatile and 
dynamic variations such as temperature or supply voltage variations can lead to 
noise in the PUF response. To eliminate the noise, PUFs can be used with error 
correcting codes (ECC) and fuzzy extractors [13]. A Ring-Oscillator PUF design 
employing index-based syndrome encoding (IBS) was shown to have very high 
reliability characteristics [13]. Further improvements over this exist, that allow a 
tradeoff between design complexity and error correction [14]. However, these error 
correcting techniques are very expensive in area and energy compared to the cost 
of the actual PUF, suggesting that they are less suitable for lightweight applications. 
2.4 Background on PUF-Based Authentication 
We use the terminology of [5] and refer to the Prover as a device with direct 
access to a PUF and the Verifier as a device used by the trusted party to discern 
whether a Prover contains a real PUF or is a counterfeit. An authentication protocol 
determines the interaction between Prover and Verifier.   
To successfully authenticate the Prover, the Verifier requires previous 
knowledge on the PUF that is accessed by it. In the PUF challenge-response-pair 
(CRP) scenario, the Verifier typically stores information about the expected CRP 
behavior of the PUF [4],[5]. Two main approaches have been proposed: 
Create a database of CRPs at the Verifier side by initially issuing a possibly 
limited amount of challenges to the PUF and recording the responses [4]. This is 
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typically done in an enrollment phase directly after manufacturing and assumes that 
model-building-attacks against the PUF are impossible due to high complexity [4]. 
Create a model of the PUF with machine learning techniques to be able to 
accurately estimate the PUF response to arbitrary challenges [5]. This approach has 
to include measures that disallow model-building for a malicious third party, e.g. 
by disabling direct PUF access [5].  
Both of these approaches have disadvantages that can ultimately lead to 
infeasibility and security issues in conventional authentication protocols. 
2.5 Authentication Protocols 
A simple authentication protocol based on issuing random challenges with 
known responses is presented in [4]. The trusted party can validate the PUF 
responses against the known responses. To handle man-in-the-middle attacks, it is 
proposed to only use each challenge once. 
Reverse fuzzy extractor [12] is a lightweight authentication scheme that 
attempts to move computationally complex or resource intensive components off 
the PUF-circuit to the authentication granting authority. It is based on reversing 
error correction schemes employed to increase PUF reliability. 
Another recent approach is Public PUF (PPUF) [15], where detailed 
physical characteristics of each PUF instance are public, allowing anyone to 
simulate PUF behavior. A PUF is then verified by not only providing the correct 
response to a challenge, but doing so in a much shorter time than possible with 
simulations. As the true response can be simulated before to issuing the challenge, 
no previous CRP storage is required. As PPUF has high latency and power 
consumption, extensions with the same principle were developed [16]. Due to the 
computational requirements and detailed device-specific measurements, PPUF is 
most suitable for small-scale applications. 
Slender PUF protocol is another lightweight protocol [5] that can be used 
for identification and authentication. The protocol has two main ideas: (i) only 
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substrings of responses are provided, and (ii) the challenges to the PUF are jointly 
created by both the Prover and the Verifier. The Verifier is assumed to have an 
ideal model of the PUF, so that a response for any possible challenge can be 
generated. The substring received from the Prover is then used to check whether it 
is indeed a substring of the real PUF response. The second idea is that neither party 
is allowed to solely generate the challenge; thus the challenge comes from a pseudo 
random number generator (PRNG), and the seed to this PRNG is determined by 
randomly generated numbers (Nonces) from both parties.  
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CHAPTER 3 
PUF SECURITY ISSUES 
In this chapter, we aim to provide a clear framework under which PUF 
designs should be evaluated by addressing possible security weaknesses regarding 
previously published PUF designs and authentication protocols. In Section 3.1, we 
discuss the impossible or impractical assumption of a known model for PUF 
designs. Then, we discuss consistency issues and memory requirements of common 
PUF assumptions. Finally, we investigate the lack of design diversity in current 
protocols, which will be the core of our proposed protocol in Chapter 4. 
3.1 Known Model Assumption 
Protocols for authentication based on PUFs typically require either a known 
model of the PUF [5], which is examined in this section, or a large set of CRPs [4], 
discussed in Section 3.3. Protocols such as Slender PUF Protocol assume that the 
trusted party can compute a true model for the PUF response, but an adversary 
cannot. This is justified by suggesting that the Prover circuit initially contains 
sensing capabilities that provide direct access to the PUF. After model generation, 
the trusted party will externally disable the direct access and thus hinder the 
malicious party from creating a model. As model-building attacks might be possible 
when the full PUF response is accessible to the outside [5],[12], the ability to 
disable the sensing connection is key to this assumption. 
However, we recognize severe obstacles in this assumption: Physical 
modification of the circuit to disable the sensing capabilities after manufacturing is 
not scalable and may negatively influence the circuit or PUF behavior. However, 
logical disabling of the sensing capability cannot be considered to be secure, as an 
adversary could acquire the relevant knowledge to re-enable it. We identify this as 
a major deficiency in existing PUF-based security protocols and propose to treat 
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the trusted and malicious party equally. Thus, we require that modeling capabilities 
of the trusted party lead to the same for the adversary and present an authentication 
scheme that does not rely on one-sided knowledge of a true PUF model. 
3.2 Security Enabled by Conventional Hardware 
PUF based systems typically also contain non-PUF circuits and 
components. To achieve clear security principles, we introduce the concept of 
security enabling and functionality enabling components: 
 Security enabling component: This component is required to provide 
security of the system. However, the system functionality does not 
depend on it and modifications of these components do not limit the 
functionality. 
 Functionality enabling component: This is a key component of the 
system, and changes lead to malfunctioning or unexpected behavior. 
Components such as a True Random Number Generator or a Pseudo 
Random Number Generator cannot be assumed to work as designed unless 
implemented with PUF, as a malicious party must be considered to be capable of 
invasive attacks. Employing such circuitry in a security enabling function will 
therefore pose a security threat. Since these conventional circuits may fail, 
suggested protocols such as [5] become attackable and cannot be used to guarantee 
security. Functionality enabling components do not pose a risk, as their 
modifications will render the system useless. For example, modifying the 
challenge-expander described in Chapter 2.3 is possible, but will modify the whole 
challenge-response behavior of the PUF and thus make it unusable. 
3.3 Exponential Memory Requirements 
When protocols do not make a known model assumption, they typically 
require that PUF responses can only be used once, as in [4]. This is legitimate and 
is a great hindrance to man-in-the-middle attacks, but also exposes the protocol to 
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks: A malicious third party can query the Verifier until 
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the stored CRP set is exhausted. This could be mitigated by storing a huge amount 
of CRPs at the Verifier side, but this ultimately causes a data storage problem. To 
withstand a DoS attack, the Verifier would be required to store large numbers of 
long CRP strings and additional synchronization bits. 
3.4 Design Uniformity 
Another major shortcoming that we observe in current protocols is the usage 
of only one type of PUF design [4][5]. This is an issue, as the wide variety of PUF 
designs that recent research has produced is not fully exploited. We emphasize that 
there exist many designs that have various advantages, such as high resistivity 
against model building attacks, high reliability, and low power consumption.  
To deal with these various issues discussed in this chapter, we will propose 
a novel SoP that exploits the advantages of different PUF designs and is used in 
conjunction with our proposed multi-level authentication protocol in Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SYSTEM OF PUFS 
In this chapter, we will explain the system of PUFs (SoP) and SoP based 
authentication protocol to address the security issues identified in Chapter 3. We 
first present the multilevel authentication protocol and explain the interaction of 
different PUF designs to achieve hardware based authentication with reduced 
resource cost. Then, the SoP specific features of breach recognition and recovery 
are explained. Finally, we discuss the role specific design choices of the PUFs 
involved in SoP and provide reference selections. 
4.1 Multilevel Authentication 
In Chapter 3, we observed that research in PUFs has yielded a variety of 
different PUF designs with unique characteristics and strengths. We embed a SoP 
with role-specific PUF designs into a multilevel authentication protocol to fully 
leverage the advantages of each PUF design.  
To provide authentication in multiple levels, the proposed system consists 
of three different PUFs, as shown in Figure 4.  
 Hidden PUF is a reliable PUF with challenge-length 𝑙𝐻 that does not expose 
the PUF responses to the outside and thus is hidden. It limits the exposure 
of Guard PUF and Secure PUF inputs to the outside.  
 Guard PUF provides the first level of authentication with a challenge-length 
of 𝑙𝐺. Although of reasonable complexity, we assume this PUF to be 
modeled by the trusted party and thus also any attacking party. It not only 
acts as a guarding stage before the Secure PUF, but also indirectly 
propagates errors of the Hidden PUF to the Verifier and thus reduces the 
critical level-2 false-negative rate. 
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 Secure PUF is the secure backbone of SoP and is impossible to model within 
reasonable time and computational complexity. This PUF has a challenge-
length of 𝑙𝑆. 
The specifics of the authentication protocol are explained in Figure 5. 
Initially, the Verifier chooses a challenge 𝐶𝑙1of bit-length 𝑙𝐺, equal to the challenge-
length of the Guard PUF. This challenge is chosen randomly and can thus fulfill 
the role of a Nonce to thwart replay attacks. Then, the challenge is issued to the 
Prover. Here, the Hidden PUF will generate the response 𝑅𝐻, which is internally 
connected to the Guard PUF and Secure PUF inputs. From 𝑅𝐻 and 𝐶𝑙1, the level-1 
response 𝑅𝐺  is generated. The output of the Hidden PUF is directly connected to 
the Guard PUF and the Secure PUF; it is not available to the outside. After 
accepting the level-1 response through a Hamming-distance check against the 
model 𝑀𝑙1, the Verifier will send the level-2 challenge 𝐶𝑙2 of length 𝑙𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ = 𝑙𝑆 −
𝑙𝐻 as a secret hash function of the initial challenge and the level-1 response. The 
Prover will generate the level-2 response from the Hidden PUF response 𝑅𝐻 and 
the level-2 challenge through the Secure PUF. Finally, the Verifier will verify the 
level-2 response 𝑅𝑆 by calculating the Hamming-distance against the true response 
stored in the database 𝐷𝐵(𝐶𝑙1). 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Components of the lightweight System of PUF (SoP). 
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 Prover Verifier 
1  Issue level-1 challenge 
Challenge 𝑪𝒍𝟏 
2 Generate PUF responses 
𝑅𝐻 = 𝑃𝑈𝐹𝐻(𝐶𝑙1[0, 𝑙ℎ]) 
𝑅𝐺 = 𝑃𝑈𝐹𝐺(𝑅𝐻, 𝐶𝑙1[𝑙ℎ, 𝑙𝐺]) 
 
3 𝑹𝑮  
4  Check level-1 response 
𝐻𝐷(𝑅𝐺 , 𝑀𝑙1(𝐶𝑙1)) < 𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙1 
5  Compute Hash 
𝑪𝒍𝟐 = 𝑯𝒂𝒔𝒉(𝑪𝒍𝟏, 𝑴𝒍𝟏(𝑪𝒍𝟏)) 
6 𝑹𝑺 = 𝑷𝑼𝑭𝑺(𝑹𝑯, 𝑪𝒍𝟐)  
7 Verify: 
𝐻𝐷(𝑅𝑆, 𝐷𝐵(𝐶𝑙1))  < 𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙2 
4.2 Breach Recognition and Recovery 
As explained in Section 4.1, the Guard PUF could be modeled by an 
adversary. Note that although this is possible, it will come with a considerable 
resource cost, as the PUF is not fully exposed to the outside.  
In this multilevel scheme, a security breach can be recognized: When a false 
Prover 𝑃′ repeatedly replies with the correct level-1 response 𝑅𝐺
′ = 𝑃′(𝐶𝑙1) but 
with incorrect level-2 responses, it is apparent that the adversary must have been 
able to build a model for the PUF and that, therefore, the first-level of SoP is 
compromised. Due to the multilevel nature of SoP, it is still possible to recognize 
the true PUF: Until all stored level-2 challenges are exhausted, the true Prover may 
successfully authenticate, at which point the Breach recovery may be initiated. 
One of the major advantages of the SoP is that it may be used with different 
PUF designs.  For higher cost applications with a larger resource budget, the Guard 
PUF can be designed to be reconfigurable. This can effectively reset the level-1 
Figure 5 Proposed authentication protocol between the Prover and the Verifier. 
The bolded items are content of the messages, which are denoted by arrows. 
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PUF behavior. As the correct Prover can be authenticated even after a level-1 
breach, the effort of the adversary can thus be reset. 
4.3 Design Choices 
In combination with the wide range of existing PUF designs, our proposed 
SoP and multilevel authentication protocol enables a variety of design choices 
adequate for different application scenarios. In ultra-low cost applications such as 
wireless-sensor networks, secure authentication is an important requirement, but 
the resources per sensor-node are minimal. Thus, a minimum implementation of 
SoP is possible that does not implement breach recovery and thus only requires 
simple PUFs – in case of a breach, the breached sensor-node can be considered to 
be dead. Additionally, instead of using multiple PUFs in parallel to increase the 
number of output bits, a single PUF can be created with challenge expanders. This 
drastically reduces area and power consumption, but reduces the output entropy. 
In addition to the degree of freedom previously described, each of the three 
PUFs has to be chosen with great attention to its specific criteria, as shown in Table 
2. The high reliability of the Hidden PUF is one of the main requirements, as any 
bit-error in 𝑅𝐻 will automatically falsify the Guard PUF and Secure PUF responses 
due to the avalanche criterion, which specifies that a single bit flip in the input will 
lead to half of the output bits flipping on average. Therefore, a high error probability 
in the Hidden PUF will require an increased error threshold for both levels.  
The high resilience to modeling attacks of the Secure PUF is a criterion 
fundamental to the security of the proposed authentication scheme. Since the only 
role of the Secure PUF is that of defending the Prover against modeling attacks, the 
reliability is of only secondary concern. Additionally, the input of the Secure PUF 
cannot be arbitrarily selected from the outside, considerably increasing the 
difficulty of modeling.  
These clear distinctions among the roles of the PUFs significantly simplify 
the design task and reduces the cost, as highly secure designs typically are 
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unreliable and have to be corrected with expensive and complex fuzzy extractors 
as described in Chapter 2.  
Table 2 PUF Design Criteria and Example Implementation. 
 
  
PUF Criteria Examples 
Low cost 
Hidden PUF 
High reliability RO PUF[4], 
Error corrected PUF[13] 
High cost 
Hidden PUF 
High reliability 
Reconfigurable 
Recyclable PUF [17] 
Guard PUF Low cost Arbiter PUF [4] 
Secure PUF High security XOR-Arbiter PUF[9], lightweight-
PUF [18], interleaved Arbiter PUF 
[10] 
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CHAPTER 5 
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
In this chapter, we will provide a security evaluation of SoP and the 
authentication protocol proposed in Chapter 4. It was previously stated that the first 
level of SoP may be modeled by an adversary without limiting the security of SoP. 
Accordingly, we will show that security of the authentication protocol is not 
contingent upon secrecy of the first-level challenge-response model. 
5.1 Attack Scenarios 
In the following, we will discuss several possible scenarios, which include 
those that would lead to successful masquerading of a malicious party as the true 
Prover in previous protocols. We will show that in practice, our proposed protocol 
is not vulnerable against man-in-the-middle attacks and is resilient to denial-of-
service attacks that would disable other protocols with limited stored CRP sets. 
5.1.1 Simple Attacker 
The attacker has to correctly guess the level-1 response with 𝑙𝐺 bits and the 
level-2 response with 𝑙𝑆 bits. The probability for a randomly guessed false positive 
𝑃𝑅𝐺𝐹𝑃 is: 
𝑃𝑅𝐺𝐹𝑃 = ( ∑ (
𝑙𝐺
𝑖
) 0.5𝑙𝐺
𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙1−1
𝑖=0
) ( ∑ (
𝑙𝑆
𝑖
) 0.5𝑙𝑆
𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙2−1
𝑖=0
) 
For the lightweight system evaluated in Chapter 6, this probability evaluates 
to 𝑃𝑅𝐺𝐹𝑃 = 1.8 ∗ 10
−8. 
5.1.2 Strong Knowledge Attack 
We consider the attack-scenario that the malicious party was in physical 
possession of the true Prover. It is possible that the malicious party generated a 
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model for the Guard PUF, as both input and output are directly exposed [9]. When 
trying to authenticate itself to a true Verifier, it will therefore correctly respond to 
the initial level-1 challenges with level-1 responses and will receive the 
corresponding level-2 challenges. However, it is numerically impossible that the 
attacker was able to generate a valid model for the full PUF system including the 
Secure PUF, as outlined in Chapter 4.1. Nonetheless, it is possible that the attacker 
gathered a large amount of CRPs including the level-2 challenges and level-2 
responses. Consider the attacker to have obtained 𝑘𝑎𝑡𝑡 CRPs. He only has to store 
level-1 challenges of length 𝑙𝐺, level-2 challenge and level-2 response, which both 
have length  𝑙𝑆 − 𝑙𝐻, for each CRP. Considering the pure data, this requires the 
attacker to store 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 = (𝑙𝐺 + 2𝑙𝑆 − 𝑙𝐻)
𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑅𝑃
 , whereas the trusted party stores only 
𝐷𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 = (𝑙𝐺 + 𝑙𝑆)
𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑅𝑃
 . As the level-2 challenge length is much larger than the level-1 
challenge length, the trusted party uses only half as much memory as the malicious 
party. Furthermore, the malicious party has to store an exponential number of CRPs 
to achieve realistic authentication probabilities. The probability for a successful 
knowledge attack 𝑃𝐾𝐴 is: 
𝑃𝐾𝐴 =
katt
2𝑙𝑆
+ (1 −
katt
2𝑙𝑆
) 𝑃𝑅𝐺𝐹𝑃 . 
In our scenario, this means that an attacker with a model for the level-1 
behavior will require 𝑘𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 2 ∗ 10
17 stored level-2 responses to achieve a false-
positive rate of 1%. This will require storage of 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 = 2 ∗ 10
17 ∗
144𝑏~3.4 ∗ 109𝐺𝐵. 
This demonstrates the efficiency of our multilevel authentication and shows 
that SoP acts as a force-multiplier that supports the trusted party in authentication 
by drastically reducing memory requirements. 
5.2 Denial-of-Service 
One security issue observed in conventional authentication protocols was 
that of denial-of-service (DoS): If the protocol handles man-in-the-middle attacks 
by using each challenge only once, a malicious party can disrupt the protocol 
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without any specific knowledge of the PUF by repeatedly initiating authentication 
until the pool of stored CRPs is fully drained. 
This is not an issue with our proposed SoP, as only the level-2 CRPs are 
stored in a database and thus exhaustible. Since the level-2 stage is only reached 
when the level-1 challenge has been correctly answered, a malicious party cannot 
initiate a DoS attack without an extensive modeling attack against the level-1 CRP 
behavior. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
For this experimental evaluation, we simulated the lightweight variant of 
SoP as described in Chapter 4.3. The specific configuration of our evaluated SoP 
consists of synthetic implementations for three selected PUF designs according to 
the criteria in Table 2 and the specific design characteristics Table 1: 
 Hidden PUF: 16-Bit input RO-PUF. 
RO-PUF is selected due to the high reliability. 
 Guard PUF: 32-Bit Arbiter PUF. 
As an intermediate PUF, guard PUF is designed to be inexpensive, 
and thus the Arbiter PUF was selected. 
 Secure PUF: 64-Bit 4-XOR Arbiter PUF. 
As the security of SoP depends on the robustness against modeling 
attacks of the Secure PUF, we select an expensive implementation 
with reduced reliability. 
6.1 Area Cost Comparison 
To provide an estimate of the area overhead incurred by authentication 
protocols based on PUF, we performed a consistent gate-level evaluation. For this 
comparison, we evaluate the main components, as the control logic introduces 
negligible overhead. 
In Table 3, the cost of our proposed lightweight SoP is given as 1767 gate-
equivalent units (GEs). Due to the entropy loss inflicted by the Syndrome generator, 
the Reverse Fuzzy Extractor requires longer responses and additionally employs a 
hash function, leading to a total cost of 5458 GEs as shown in Table 4. Despite cost 
saving measures, such as a lightweight hash function and challenge expanders 
instead of multiple parallel PUF instances, Reverse Fuzzy Extractor does not take 
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advantage of the unique strength of different PUF designs and instead relies on 
conventional circuitry.  Therefore, our lightweight SoP reduces the gate count by 
68%. 
Note that the Reverse Fuzzy Extractor requires a 6-XOR Arbiter PUF 
implementation, as the input-output behavior is fully exposed and could therefore 
be modeled when a less complex PUF design is chosen [9]. In comparison, SoP 
does not fully expose the challenges of the secure PUF, warranting for a less 
complex implementation. 
Table 3 Gate Equivalent Cost of Lightweight System of PUFs. 
Component Explanation Gate-equivalent 
units 
Hidden PUF 16-Bit RO-PUF 145 
Guard PUF 32-Bit Arbiter PUF 130 
Secure PUF 64-Bit 4-XOR PUF 1032 
Challenge Expanders 16-Bit + 32-Bit + 64-Bit LFSRs 460 
Total  1767 
 
Table 4 Gate Equivalent Cost of Reverse Fuzzy Extractor. 
Component Explanation Gate-equivalent 
units 
PUF 64-Bit 6-XOR PUF 1544 
Challenge Expander 255-Bit LFSR 1024 
Syndrome Generator 234-Bit LFSR 940 
SPONGE Hash 256-Bit light-weight Hash 1950 
Total  5458 
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6.2 Hamming Distances 
The move towards SoP that contains PUF sequences requires special 
consideration of the individual design characteristics. As explained in Section 4.3, 
we chose the Hidden PUF as an implementation of a RO-PUF, as it is the most 
reliable design available from the comparison in Table 1. The Hamming distances 
of each PUF component are shown in Figure 6, and the propagated error from the 
Hidden PUF can be seen in the Guard PUF and Secure PUF around 𝐻𝐷 = 16 and 
𝐻𝐷 = 32 respectively. This shows that even a minor error in the Hidden PUF leads 
to a large error with 𝐹𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 = 0.5 for Guard PUF and Secure PUF. Figure 6 also 
shows why we selected 𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙1 = 5  and 𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙2 = 21 as parameters for the 
protocol: The real responses of the Guard PUF have a Hamming Distance of 5 or 
less to the ideal response. Similarly, the correct responses of the Secure PUF have 
a Hamming Distance of 21 or less. 
6.3 Authentication 
For authentication, the false-positive and false-negative rates are an 
important quality metric, as they represent the amount of authentication attempts 
that were falsely accepted or rejected, respectively. In our experiments, 𝑃𝐹𝑁,𝑙1 =
7.8% of the level-1 responses had an error that exceeded the tolerance of 𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙1 
and were thus falsely rejected. The cause of this lies in the strict avalanche criterion, 
and the series connection between the Hidden PUF and the Guard PUF. Thus, the 
protocol behaves as intended and rejects bit-errors in the Hidden PUF already at the 
first level. With an adequately chosen tolerance 𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙2 at the second level and 
the Hidden PUF errors already filtered at the first level, only 𝑃𝐹𝑁,𝑙2 = 0.257% of 
the level-2 responses were incorrectly rejected.  
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Figure 6 Hamming distances of each of the three PUF components. It can be 
observed that an error in the Hidden PUF (top) will propagate and lead to a large 
error in the Guard PUF (center) and the Secure PUF (bottom) due to the strict 
avalanche criterion. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
We presented a multi-level authentication protocol that takes advantage of 
a combination of different PUF-designs to minimize resource allocation. SoP does 
not require expensive error-correction, as high reliability designs are employed 
where required. By specifying the role of each employed PUF design, SoP not only 
simplifies the design, but also allows the selection of PUF designs according to 
their own unique strengths. In comparison to existing protocols, the need for latency 
and power intensive hash functions on the PUF circuit is replaced by a combination 
of strong PUFs and a secret hash at the verifier side, significantly reducing the area. 
With breach recognition and recovery, new security features are introduced and 
shown to improve robustness against attacks, while simultaneously enhancing 
reusability. A low-cost implementation of SoP was shown to reduce the area by 
68% in a gate-level comparison. This low resource allocation and high flexibility 
allow SoP to provide a security solution tailored for ubiquitous computing devices. 
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